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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Picture a typical law student in her Professional Responsibility course, learning 
the American Bar Association’s various frameworks for client confidentiality and 
candor toward a tribunal.  If she is like most law students, she would easily agree 
with the precept that a lawyer must keep her client’s confidences; she would like the 
sense of trust that confidentiality builds between lawyer and client.  As class 
instruction turns to the rules on candor to a court, the law student’s internal moral 
compass would surely lead her to agree that a lawyer must tell the truth to a judge.  
Her relative lack of experience with people in legal trouble could bring her a 
somewhat unsettled feeling at the realization that a desperate client might perjure 
himself to achieve exoneration.  Her discomfort would probably grow to a sense of 
unbalance once she learns that model rules require a lawyer to tell on her client once 
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the lawyer comprehends that the client has perjured or will perjure himself.  And that 
sense of unbalance would undoubtedly develop into outright cognitive dissonance if 
she realizes that every model ethics guide promulgated by the ABA places a lawyer 
in the position of violating either the rule of confidentiality or the rule of candor in 
the service of fulfilling the other. 
At that point, the law student might assume that her conclusion simply must be 
inaccurate and that the nation’s legal experts have provided some concrete steps for 
lawyers to take in the highly charged situation when a client’s interests in 
confidentiality clash with the interests of justice.  After all, the current rule on candor 
toward a tribunal tells a lawyer that when she confronts a perjury situation, she must 
take “reasonable remedial measures.”1  Surely, those “measures” provide the steps, 
the path, for the lawyer to take to resolve the conflict—and resolve it in an ethical 
manner.  Sadly, any law student who immerses herself in the study of professional 
ethics must draw the conclusion that those “measures” provide neither path nor safe 
harbor.  At this stage of realization, the law student likely closes her ethics casebook 
and silently hopes that she never finds herself in that situation.  But then she passes 
the bar, becomes a practicing lawyer, represents a lying client, and suffers the full 
force of her dismay: she has no way out of this ethical dilemma.  And now it’s a real 
situation, not an academic exercise.  With no way out, she is likely to face 
professional discipline for any step she takes because that step will conflict with 
some other ethical or constitutional mandate.  This forced false choice deprives the 
lawyer of due process. 
The ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 mandates “reasonable 
remedial measures” for lawyers who have to navigate the competing mandates of 
client confidentiality and honesty to a court.2  Unacceptably, the Model Rules do not 
define what measures would be both reasonable and remedial.  The non-binding 
commentary following Rule 3.3 does spell out several steps for a lawyer to take: 
remonstrate with the client, withdraw from representation, disclose the perjury to the 
court.3  Unfortunately for the lawyer in the bind, these steps almost always prove to 
be ineffective, unavailable, and hopelessly contradictory.  This witches’ brew 
deprives the lawyer of due process when her inability to satisfy judge and bar 
counsel results in court-imposed sanctions or professional discipline. 
Analyzing the inherent conflict posed by the use of an undefined mandate—
“reasonable remedial measures”—leads to analysis of the even deeper, unresolvable 
conflicts in the primary steps prescribed by commentary: the client’s narration of his 
own story, the lawyer’s withdrawal from representation, and the lawyer’s disclosure 
of the client’s false evidence.  Not all of the reasonable remedial measures protect 
both the client’s confidentiality and the court’s insistence on honesty, and none of 
them protects the lawyer from charges of impropriety.  In the face of the utter failure 
of the Model Rules to accomplish their conflicting goals, the ABA’s rules drafters 
should start over from the beginning with a clear-eyed view of which one goal is 
most important to them.  They do not have to stay with the current failed regime.  
They could, instead, provide direct and defined rules that people of reasonable 
                                                          
 
1
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
2
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
3
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
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intelligence can understand and fulfill.  Doing so is, at this point, the only way by 
which the ABA can maintain any credibility in its leadership position in the realm of 
legal ethics. 
II.  CONFLICTS IN “REASONABLE REMEDIAL MEASURES” 
What is a lawyer to do when he discovers that his client has committed perjury or 
is about to?  From the very first days of lawyer regulation, the various versions of 
the legal ethics codes have contemplated some sort of action by a lawyer to rectify a 
client’s fraud or perjury.  The actions—whether mandated or merely suggested—
have spawned a cottage industry of interpreters because no agreement exists on what 
the rules mean.4 
The 1908 aspirational Canons of Professional Ethics stated: 
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, 
which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor 
to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses to 
forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the 
injured person or his counsel, so that [he] may take appropriate steps.5 
Sixty-five years later, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility directed that: 
[a] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [h]is 
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a 
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, 
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to 
the affected person or tribunal.6 
This mandatory rule, as opposed to the Canons’ aspirational goal, first requires 
the lawyer to ask—“call upon”—his client to correct the perjury.  If the client 
refuses, the lawyer must disclose the fraud.  The unqualified disclosure requirement 
seems to have been unintended by the drafters, for five years later, the ABA 
amended this disciplinary rule to read that the lawyer “shall reveal the fraud to the 
affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged 
                                                          
 
4
 See generally Nathan M. Crystal, False Testimony by Criminal Defendants: Still 
Unanswered Ethical and Constitutional Questions, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529 (2003); Steven 
H. Goldberg, Heaven Help the Lawyer for a Civil Liar, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 885 (1989); 
Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 
BROOK. L. REV. 485 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian 
Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041 (1997); Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, 
Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209 
(2006); Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in Criminal Cases: Still in Search of an Answer, 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (1987); J. Kevin Quinn, Nancy K. Kubasek & M. Neil Browne, 
Resisting the Individualistic Flavor of Opposition to Model Rule 3.3, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
901 (1995); George Rutherglen, Dilemmas and Disclosures: A Comment on Client Perjury, 19 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 267 (1992); Joseph P. Williams, Client Perjury and the Duty of Candor, 6 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1005 (1993). 
 
5
 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 41 (1908). 
 
6
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) (amended 1974).  
What constitutes a “privileged communication” under the Model Code has also been a source 
of confusion to lawyers.  See infra Part C.1. 
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communication.”7  After that amendment, the disciplinary rule seemed to require 
disclosure only when the lawyer’s knowledge of the perjury came from information 
that was not protected as a client confidence or secret—a rare occurrence.8 
By 1983, the drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct tried to capture 
this idea of a lawyer’s response to client perjury in a term of art: “[i]f a lawyer has 
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures.”9  Although phrased in the past tense (“has offered”), 
the rule made no express distinction between past and future fraud on a court,10 but 
commentators and courts treated the term as covering both.11 
The original version of the Model Rules, published in 1983, nowhere defined 
“reasonable remedial measures,” revealing, perhaps, the drafters’ belief that the 
phrase was a term of art, already understood by the relevant judicial players.  
Drafting the rules on the mistaken assumption of such an understanding, or taking 
easy way out by leaving the interpretation to courts and commentators, was an 
abdication of the drafters’ responsibilities to lawyers, lawyers’ clients, and the judges 
before whom they appeared.12  Rather than do the hard work of defining the term, the 
drafters deferred to Rule 3.3’s comments to illuminate the phrase—entirely new to 
the bar with the Model Rules—and succeeded only in casting darkness where they 
should have been shedding light.  The non-binding, supplementary commentary 
following the rules was unorganized, intellectually sloppy, tentative, and internally 
contradictory.  Here are some highlights: 
 
• Comment 5 theorizes that upon learning that “material” evidence was 
false, “the lawyer should seek to persuade [his] client that the evidence 
should not be offered;” if the evidence had already been offered, the 
lawyer should seek to persuade the client to come clean with the court.13  
If persuasion were ineffective, “the lawyer must take reasonable 
remedial measures.”14  Until the final sentence, the guiding commentary 
                                                          
 
7
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974).  
 
8
 Some commentators have concluded that once it was amended this way, the Model 
Code “hardly ever” requires the lawyer to disclose the perjury to the court.  See, e.g., Charles 
W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 820 (1978).  But see infra Part C.1. 
 
9
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 
10
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
11
 See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 38 (Ct. App. 1999) (conflating 
remediation of past perjury with prevention of future perjury by including narration among 
other reasonable remedial measures); ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, Legal 
Background (1996); Mary C. Daly, Identifying and Resolving Ethical Problems that Arise in 
Trying Commercial Cases, 502 PLI/LIT 185 (1994); David D. Dodge, When Your Client 
Wants to Lie: How to Protect Yourself, Your Client and the Judicial System, 35 ARIZ. ATT’Y 
12, 34-36 (1998). 
 
12
 See generally Wolfram, supra note 8. 
 
13
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 
14
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
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is aspirational only.15  When the comment does become directive, it uses 
the term to define the term, a lazy technique that the drafters also 
employ in other parts of the ethics codes.16 
 
• Comment 6 claims that the “generally recognized” rule is that if 
disclosure to the court is necessary to rectify the fraud, then the lawyer 
“must” disclose the fraud—except in the defense of a criminal 
defendant.17  But six paragraphs later, Comment 12 gives the reader 
whiplash when it states that the general disclosure rule does apply to 
defense counsel in criminal cases.18  The quick change of heart may 
have revealed the drafters’ fear of exempting a large portion of the bar 
from the rule’s reach, a simple proofreading error, or a genuine lack of 
understanding of what they were trying to require. 
 
• Comment 11 officially addresses the term “remedial measures,” 
establishing an unofficial behavioral landscape for managing client 
perjury: the “proper course” “ordinarily” is to remonstrate with the 
client confidentially.  If that fails to produce rectifying results, the 
lawyer “should” seek to withdraw.  “If withdrawal [would] not remedy 
the situation or is impossible, the [lawyer] should” disclose the perjury 
to the court.19  Of course, the comment’s moral imperative of “should”20 
creates the appearance that withdrawal and disclosure are choices for 
the lawyer, not mandates, but this language proves a trap even for the 
wary. 
 
Together with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA publishes the 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a volume that collects case 
annotations of the rules and extended commentary on their meaning.  The authors of 
this annotated volume congratulated the drafters on resolving the Model Code’s 
ambiguity regarding the action required when a lawyer learns that he has offered 
false evidence.21  These writers are the only ones who could have believed that 
congratulations were in order.  No one actually operating under a version of these 
rules could have thought so.  The years between 1983 and 2000 witnessed an 
outpouring of analysis and criticism of the Model Rules on confidentiality and 
                                                          
 
15
 “Should” indicates a moral imperative.  See WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
778 (1949). 
 
16
 See generally Susan E. Thrower, How Can I Confuse Thee?  Let Me Count the Ways: 
An Argument for a Due Process-Based Reality in the Ethics Rules Governing Lawyer 
Confidentiality and Candor, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 329 (2010). 
 
17
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
18
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
19
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 
20
 See generally Thrower, supra note 16. 
 
21
 See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, Model Code Comparison (1996). 
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candor and on their labyrinthine and internally inconsistent language.22  The claimed 
impetus behind the Ethics 2000, a wholesale review of the 1983 Model Rules, was to 
address some of this criticism.23  The project was a failure from this perspective.  
Unlike the 1983 version, the 2002 Model Rules expressly differentiated between past 
perjury and prospective perjury and prescribed “reasonable remedial measures” for 
both.24  Under new Rule 3.3(a)(1), “a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make any false 
statement of fact”—the rule dropped 1983’s qualifier “material,” surely an 
improvement25—but he must now correct a previous false statement of “material” 
fact—qualifier undefined.26  Neither the rule nor its explanatory commentary 
provided a rationale for this differentiation between past and future falsity. 
The undefined “material” makes another appearance in Rule 3.3(a)(3) in setting 
up the reasonable remedial measures principle: the rule applies if the lawyer learns 
that he, his client, or his witness has offered false “material evidence.”27  Further 
obfuscating the ethical picture, this rule injected yet another degree of uncertainty 
into the lawyer’s deliberations of whether to disclose the falsity with the undefined 
qualification of, “if necessary”: “the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”28 
This concept of necessity had made its way from the 1983 version’s Comment 6 
into the 2002 rule language.  The migration of language from a non-binding 
comment to a binding rule should have been a normative good for purposes of 
statutory interpretation, but in this case, the drafters succeeded in increasing, not 
decreasing, uncertainty.  Although the new rule itself does not state what the 
disclosure would be “necessary” for, the 1983 and 2002 comments imply that the 
necessity is to rectify the situation of a court being misled by false evidence.29  
Utterly opaque is how the lawyer is to determine if disclosure is, indeed, 
“necessary.”  The rest of the rule is a blank on this point.  Perhaps the witness’s lie is 
so patent that the judge sees through it at once and needs no warning.  But if the 
lawyer does not know of the judge’s awareness and employs the necessity rule to 
disclose the falsity, he violates his duty of client confidentiality and opens himself to 
professional discipline. 
                                                          
 
22
 See generally Goldberg, supra note 4; Hazard, supra note 4; Quinn, Kubasek & 
Browne, supra note 4. 
 
23
 See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 4, at 1531-50 (presenting various problems and omissions 
of 1983 Rules and showing attempts at clarification in 2002 version). 
 
24
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) & R. 3.3 cmts. 6 & 10 (2002); see also 
Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin 
Frankel’s Proposal for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 613, 635-36 
(2005). 
 
25
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 
26
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002); see Walfish, supra note 24, at 
635-36 & nn.129, 133. 
 
27
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002). 
 
28
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002) (emphasis added); see also 
Walfish, supra note 24, at 636 & n.131. 
 
29
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/4
2010] NEITHER REASONABLE NOR REMEDIAL 787 
 
This is a result unworthy of the drafters because it was foreshadowed by cases 
interpreting the Model Code and so could have been avoided during the drafting of 
the Model Rules.  In Butler v. United States,30 a criminal defendant changed his story 
and, in doing so, caused his lawyer to believe that he would commit perjury if 
allowed to testify.31  The lawyer’s remonstrations with his client were having no 
effect, so during an in camera meeting, the lawyer explained to the judge why he 
could not put his client on the stand.32  The judge agreed wholeheartedly that the 
lawyer’s participation in perjury would be a violation of his professional ethics.33  
Upon the defendant’s conviction, the appeals court was especially hard on the judge 
for not certifying the case to another judge once learning of the lawyer’s disbelief in 
his client’s case.34  It also criticized the lawyer for unnecessarily betraying his 
client’s confidences to the judge, implying that the betrayal constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel and led to the deprivation of the client’s due process.35  The 
appeals judge strongly sided with the duty of confidentiality, but both the lawyer and 
trial judge had thought that the merits of the dilemma were with the duty of 
honesty.36  The formal capture of the “if necessary” caveat to the 2002 Model Rule 
3.3 is predictably playing out in courts with Butler-like confusion. 
Although the 2002 version still provides no definition of “reasonable remedial 
measures” in either the Terminology section or within the body of Rule 3.3, its 
Comment 10 did become a bit more expansive in explaining those steps that a 
lawyer is to take upon having offered “material” perjurious evidence.  This comment 
spells out a routine for the lawyer to follow when the lawyer “knows” that the client 
or witness has perjured himself—either on direct examination or cross-examination 
or at a deposition.37  The fact that the rule itself actually identifies none of these 
litigation activities creates yet another ambiguity.38  But forging ahead, now the 
“proper” course for a lawyer is to (1) remonstrate confidentially; (2) advise the client 
of the lawyer’s duty of candor; and (3) seek the client’s cooperation with respect to 
withdrawal or correction of the falsity.  If that fails to prompt the client to come 
clean, the lawyer must go further: (4) seek withdrawal; and (5) if withdrawal is 
refused or will not undo the effect of the falsity, disclose the fraud as is “reasonably 
necessary” to remedy the fraud, even if the disclosure will reveal confidential 
information.39 
                                                          
 
30
 Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980). 
 
31
 Id. at 845. 
 
32
 Id. 
 
33
 Id. 
 
34
 Id. at 852-53. 
 
35
 Id. at 851. 
 
36
 Id. at 845.  See also infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. 
 
37
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002). 
 
38
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002). 
 
39
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).  But see Monroe H. 
Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1939, 1953 (1988).  Professor Freedman, famously opposed to any sort of disclosure, 
argued that if remonstration fails and withdrawal is not an option, “the lawyer must present 
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The “proper course,” though appearing to be detailed, still suffers from the flaw 
of ambiguity.  For both committed and prospective perjury, the actual rule language 
mandates the lawyer: he “shall” take reasonable remedial measures.40  
Confoundingly, the non-binding comments amplifying the rule equivocate, 
mandating that a lawyer take reasonable remedial measures for past falsity,41 but 
merely encouraging measures for prospective perjury: the lawyer “should” seek to 
persuade the client to refrain from committing it.42  The rules say “shall,” but the 
comments mix “should,” “must,” and “may.”43  The comments come back together 
once the lawyer’s measures have failed to rectify the fraud, telling the lawyer that he 
“must” disclose the perjury to the court.44 
Remonstrate, withdraw, disclose: boiled down to their essentials, this is what the 
Rule 3.3 comments advise for the lawyer facing client perjury.45  Beyond their non-
binding nature, the real measure of the comments’ impotence in guiding lawyers is 
their porous language: “proper” course, not mandatory course;46 “ordinarily,” not 
always;47 “should” seek to withdraw, not must seek to withdraw;48 “should” disclose 
perjury, not must disclose perjury;49 “must disclose” as “is reasonably necessary”;50 
“must refuse” to offer false evidence,51 but “should” resolve doubts in the client’s 
                                                          
the client’s testimony in the ordinary way and remain true to the lawyer’s pledge of 
confidentiality.”  Id. 
 
40
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).  
 
41
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002). 
 
42
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (2002) (“If . . . the client intends . . . , 
the lawyer should . . . .”). 
 
43
 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 1-11 (2002). 
 
44
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002). 
 
45
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 7 & 11 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002); see also Wolfram, supra note 8, at 846-66.  
Professor Wolfram synthesized the steps of remonstration into five elements: (1) the lawyer 
should advise his client that perjury is a crime; (2) the lawyer should advise his client of the 
risks that he faces by testifying falsely or by promptly rectifying his perjury; (3) the lawyer 
should urge the client to testify truthfully or to disclose fully the true facts when he has 
already committed perjury; (4) the lawyer should inform his client that failure to follow his 
advice would force the lawyer to withdraw from the representation; and (5) in jurisdictions 
that require disclosure, the lawyer should tell his client that he will have to reveal his client’s 
perjury.  Id. at 846-47.     
 
46
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
47
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
48
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002).  The actual 
rule language omits any mention of a reasonableness standard for the necessity principle. 
 
49
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
50
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002).   
 
51
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6 (2002). 
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favor, yet “cannot” ignore “obvious” falsehoods.52  The entire scheme is a rat’s nest.  
With such conflicting duties to follow, lawyers and commentators must question the 
drafters’ intent to be effective at prescribing the expected behavior.  What is a lawyer 
to do when he finds himself in one of the non-“ordinary” situations?  How is a 
lawyer even to perceive that he is in one of those non-ordinary situations?  The 
comments are silent. 
This open question followed the similar gaping hole created when the ABA’s 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility carelessly tossed off 
this dicta in a formal opinion construing the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility: “The tradition [of exempting client confidences, and not just 
information protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, from disclosure in 
cases of client perjury] . . . is so important that it should take precedence, in all but 
the most serious cases, over the duty [of disclosure of perjury].”53  The Committee 
made no further effort to illuminate what those “most serious cases” might be.  At 
the end of that opinion, the Committee announced that its interpretation of the rule to 
preserve confidential information from disclosure “minimizes the problems” of 
lawyers with lying clients,54 giving no heed to the lawyers who would fall through 
the cracks due to the rules drafters’ faulty thinking and writing.  Apparently, some 
undeserved lawyer discipline is acceptable to them. 
The language of the ABA’s rules, comments, and interpretive opinions is simply 
not designed to do the one job that it has: to tell those governed, “Do this, and you 
will fulfill your duty; disobey this, and you will violate your duty.”  Noting similar 
interpretive problems with Model Rule 1.6 on confidentiality, one scholar expressed 
a similar sentiment: 
Model Rule 1.6(b), within its context of the entire Model Rules, does not 
preclude a lawyer from inferentially revealing client confidences to 
protect victims of a client’s continuing or planned fraud.  On the other 
hand, there is a potentially strong argument that the profession would be 
better served by relying less on a collateral rule to modify and limit 
inferentially the specific language of the very rule that is designed to 
address the disclosure question.  For this reason . . . the profession might 
well give serious consideration to the development of a revised rule that 
says what it means, means what it says . . . .55 
Another question the drafters left unaddressed is how quickly after discovering 
perjury or fraud a lawyer must begin the reasonable remedial measures.  While Rule 
3.3 and Comment 13 set the conclusion of the proceeding as an outside limit on the 
duration of the duty to remediate,56 the drafters provide no starting gun by which a 
lawyer is to launch the measures.  The Supreme Court of Idaho suspended a 
                                                          
 
52
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002). 
 
53
 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (emphasis 
added). 
 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility: Too 
Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 727, 739 (1994). 
 
56
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) & R. 3.3 cmt. 13 (1983) (amended 2002); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) & R. 3.3 cmt. 13 (2002). 
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prosecutor thirty days for not beginning measures fast enough.57  The prosecutor had 
not been paying attention to a witness’ specific testimony because he was reading his 
notes, preparing for his next questions, when the witness lied.58  The prosecutor 
learned of the witness’ false testimony only when a fellow prosecutor alerted him to 
it later that day.59  He visited the witness right after learning of the problem and 
prepared to call him to the stand the next day to correct the falsity, but by then, the 
defense lawyer had learned of the perjury, and the judge had declared a mistrial.60  
The disciplinary board ruled that the lawyer should have invoked reasonable 
remedial measures at the moment the witness told the lie.61  As the lawyer was 
unaware of the existence of the falsity when it occurred, he could never have 
satisfied this standard.  In the absence of any rule on this timing issue, lawyers 
apparently must act immediately, even when they are unaware of a problem.62  Only 
in two jurisdictions must those subject to rule act in the absence of knowledge: 
Wonderland and the realm of legal ethics.63 
The disparity between Rule 3.3 and its comments, and the absence of answers to 
legitimate questions unanswered by the rules, are not mere academic abstractions.  
The Scope section of the Model Rules states that the “[c]omments do not add 
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the 
Rules.”64  When the comments—meant to provide lawyers with guidance—are 
inconsistent with the rules or with each other, they fail to fulfill their purpose.  Does 
the mix of mandate and aspiration in the comments relating to potential perjury mean 
that a lawyer could take some, but not all, of the measures—or different measures—
in seeking to persuade a client to refrain from perjuring himself and still satisfy the 
rule’s mandatory language?  A lawyer must find out on his own, for the rule drafters 
have not seen fit to tell him.  The drafters were either unable or unwilling to say 
what they mean and mean what they say.65 
A.  Narration 
Lawyers struggled with the 1969 Model Code’s absolute conflict between the 
duties of revealing fraud but maintaining client confidential information.  Some 
sources of would-be guidance did appear along the way, but they were not much 
                                                          
 
57
 See Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 44 P.3d 1141 (Idaho 2002). 
 
58
 Id. at 1143, 1146-47. 
 
59
 Id. at 1147. 
 
60
 Id.  
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 But see Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176, 1177 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (finding 
lawyer acted with “reasonable dispatch” in informing the trial court of defendant’s potential 
perjury, even though “it would have been nicer” to have learned of potential ethical issue on 
the same day the lawyer did; trial court recognized that lapse of one day permitted lawyer to 
research his ethical duties). 
 
63
 “Sentence first, verdict afterwards.”  LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN 
WONDERLAND 187 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1898) (1865). 
 
64
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope para. 14 (2002). 
 
65
 Cf. Weinstein, supra note 55, at 739. 
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help.  Identifying the peril that this conflict represented for criminal defense lawyers 
in particular, a separate constituency in the ABA tried to fill the gap.  In the early 
1970s, members of the ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for 
Criminal Justice drafted the Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the 
Defense Function.66  The Defense Function Standards were to serve as guidelines for 
the criminal defense bar to follow when a criminal defendant announces the intent to 
commit perjury.  Standard 4-7.7 requires that the lawyer first remonstrate with his 
client against lying.67  If remonstration is unsuccessful and trial has not started, the 
lawyer may withdraw, if feasible.68  If the court will not permit withdrawal, the 
lawyer “should” make a file record of the failure of his remonstrance “in some 
appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the court.”69  At trial, the lawyer is 
to confine his examination to identifying the client and permitting him to make a 
statement to the finder of fact—no direct examination, no later arguing the client’s 
version of the facts.70  The lawyer is not afterward to refer to or rely on known 
perjury in his argument to the fact-finder, but he is not otherwise to reveal the falsity 
of the client’s testimony.71 
The authoring committee withdrew these suggested Standards before they came 
before the ABA House of Delegates for consideration and adoption,72 but the 
concept of permitting the criminal defendant to “make a statement” to the fact-finder 
had some staying power, making its way into the 1983 Model Rule 3.3 comment 9.73  
It appears to have been a compromise position along the way from the 1969 Model 
                                                          
 
66
 See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 
(1971); cf. People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 813-14 (Ct. App. 1998); STEPHEN GILLERS 
& ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 258 (2007). 
 
67
 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 4-7.7(a) (1971). 
 
68
 See id.; see also Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813-14; GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 66, 
at 258; Barry R. Vickrey, Tell It Only to the Judge: Disclosure of Client Confidences Under 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 60 N.D. L. REV. 261, 270 (1984).  The 
Defense Function Standards advise a lawyer not to give the judge the reason for the 
withdrawal request.  See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 66, at 258; Wolfram, supra note 8, at 
861. 
 
69
 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 4-7.7(c) (1971). 
 
70
 Id. 
 
71
 Id.; see Brent R. Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside on Attorney-Client 
Relations, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1921-22 (1988); Wolfram, supra note 8, at 826-27.  A 
more modern reader can see in these steps the shape of what would later become the Model 
Rules’ reasonable remedial measures. 
 
72
 See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 66, at 259.  The second edition of the ABA Standards 
of Criminal Justice, published in 1979, omitted Standard 4-7.7.  See ANN. MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. Utilizing the Narrative Approach when Client Intends Perjury 
(1992). 
 
73
 “Three resolutions of this dilemma [of a lawyer’s participation in perjury] have been 
proposed.  One is to permit the accused to testify by a narrative without guidance through the 
lawyer’s questioning.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9 (1983) (amended 
2002). 
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Code’s single directive of disclosure to the court74 to the Model Rules’ more 
stepped-progression “reasonable remedial measures.”  The approach allows the 
client to take the stand and freely narrate his story, without questioning by the 
lawyer.75  The theory of the approach is that because the lawyer is not guiding the 
client by questioning him, he is not “offering” evidence that he knows to be false. 
The ABA has been particularly torn over the use of the “free narrative approach” 
for the potentially perjuring criminal defendant.  By the time the House of Delegates 
had approved Model Rule 3.3 in 1983, the drafters had become nervous about the 
practice of narration: comment 9 recognizes the existence of the approach76 and then 
immediately rejects its use as a denigration of both the principles of confidentiality 
and candor.77 
Despite this 1983 rejection, courts quickly took to the practice.  Federal and state 
courts from Washington, D.C., to Alaska, from the mid-1970s past the turn of the 
twenty-first century, adopted narration as a decent, if imperfect, solution to the 
perjury dilemma.78  Accordingly, the commentary to the 2002 Model Rules retained 
the recognition of the approach and acknowledged the practice among the nation’s 
courts.79  Comment 7 noted that in a contest between a court mandate of narration 
and Rule 3.3’s prohibition on knowingly offering false evidence, the lawyer’s 
                                                          
 
74
 Before the 1974 amendment, no exception existed regarding disclosure of information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102 (1969) (amended 1974). 
 
75
 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 4-7.7 (c) (1971); see also Appel, supra note 71, at 1921-22; Lefstein, supra note 4, at 
541; Wolfram, supra note 8, at 826-27. 
 
76
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
77
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
78
 See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978); United States ex 
rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977); Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 881 
(Alaska 1980); People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1988) (holding use of narrative leading 
to conviction did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel nor violation of client 
confidentiality); People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 817 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating the 
narrative approach represented best accommodation of competing interests of lawyer and 
client); People v. Gadson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 226 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the lawyer’s 
use of narrative was reasonable attempt to solve “a dilemma to which there was no clear 
solution”); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1976); Herbert v. United States, 
340 A.2d 802 (D.C. 1975); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
(endorsing the narrative approach when criminal defendant demands to testify and lawyer 
believes defendant will perjure himself); State v. Waggoner, 864 P.2d 162 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1993); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (rejecting convicted defendant’s 
claim of Sixth Amendment violation after trial judge ordered him to testify in narrative); 
People v. Lowery, 366 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Fosnight, 679 P.2d 174 (Kan. 
1984); People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 2001); People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 
711 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Commonwealth v. Mascitti, 534 A.2d 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d, 
546 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1988) (ordering criminal defendant to testify by narrative, judge sounded 
rare note of concern for lawyer in confidence/perjury dilemma); In re Goodwin, 305 S.E.2d 
578, 580 (S.C. 1983); State v. Layton, 432 S.E.2d 740, 755 (W. Va. 1993); see also Crystal, 
supra note 4, at 1547-48. 
 
79
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (2002). 
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obligation under the Rule must give way to the judge’s order.80  The ABA’s Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility likewise dismisses narration as 
a method of insulating a lawyer from a charge of assisting a client’s perjury.81  This 
stutter-step reveals the ABA’s own internal conflict with the principles that should 
guide and govern lawyers facing possible perjury.  Lawyers and courts have, not 
surprisingly, mirrored that confusion and inconsistency. 
Butler v. United States82 illustrates one such mess.  The criminal defendant had 
once told his lawyer that he had had a gun during the commission of the crime and 
then later told his lawyer that he had not.83  The lawyer remonstrated with his client 
unsuccessfully.84  When the lawyer urged his client to accept the prosecution’s plea 
offer, the client then accused the lawyer of ineffective assistance of counsel.85  At 
that point, the lawyer disclosed to the judge the merits of his client’s case and his 
belief that his client would commit perjury, in defense of the ineffective assistance 
claim.86  At the client’s insistence, the case went to trial, and the lawyer did not call 
the client to testify, but he suggested to the judge that the judge let the client narrate 
his story.87  Ultimately, the court did not make that offer to the client, and the client 
did not testify.88 
During the appeal of the conviction, the appeals court considered the client’s 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.89  The court concluded that the record did 
not support the inference that the lawyer knew that his client was going to commit 
perjury.90  At that point, the lawyer knew only that his client had made inconsistent 
statements, not that he would perjure himself.91  The lawyer, the trial judge, and the 
appeals court all came to different conclusions as to what should have happened.  
According to the appeals court, the lawyer had unnecessarily betrayed his client’s 
confidences to the trial judge.92  In turn, the trial judge should have certified the case 
to another judge once he had learned of the defendant’s potential perjury.93  The 
appeals court concluded that the cumulative effect of the lawyer’s actions deprived 
                                                          
 
80
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (2002).  This comment was unhelpful, 
given that state bar counsel spared no pains in prosecuting lawyers for alleged violations of 
the rules despite court orders to proceed in opposition to them.  See infra Part II.B. 
 
81
 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987). 
 
82
 Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980). 
 
83
 Id. at 845. 
 
84
 Id. 
 
85
 Id. at 845-46. 
 
86
 Id. at 848. 
 
87
 Id. at 847-48. 
 
88
 Id. at 848 n.6. 
 
89
 Id. at 848-50. 
 
90
 Id. at 850. 
 
91
 Id.  
 
92
 Id. at 851.  See also supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
 
93
 Butler, 414 A.2d at 851. 
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the defendant of due process.94  The Butler court thought that the lawyer, instead, 
should have followed Defense Function Standard 4-7.7 and permitted his client to 
testify in a narrative,95 despite the fact that no governing body had ever adopted the 
Standards. 
[T]he courts [that] have weighed the dilemma of a defense counsel, faced 
with the unenviable position of representing a client whom he knows will 
commit perjury, have approved (for jury trials at least) the recommended 
accommodation of the ABA Standards[,] which meets both ethical 
requirements of protecting clients’ confidences and refraining from 
wrongdoing.96 
The court iterated its conclusion from earlier cases that Standard 4-7.7 is meant to be 
used when the lawyer knows—not merely suspects—that the defendant’s testimony 
is false. 
Other courts have rejected this stringent and largely unprovable knowledge 
standard or simply have been unconcerned with the lawyer’s certainty before 
invoking narration.  In one Pennsylvania trial for child sexual abuse, the lawyers 
participated in an in-chambers hearing, during which the defendant’s lawyer 
informed the judge that he believed that the defendant intended to testify falsely.97  
During prior plea negotiations, the defendant had authorized his lawyer to reveal 
confidential communications that were in direct conflict with a claim of complete 
innocence, but later, the defendant said that he planned to deny all sexual contact 
with the victim.98  The court denied the lawyer’s motion to withdraw and informed 
the defendant that he would have to testify by narrative, rather than by direct 
examination.99  In admonishing the defendant against perjury and explaining the 
process of narration, the trial judge sounded the single note of concern for a lawyer 
in a perjury dilemma, telling the defendant that  
I’m not going to require [the lawyer] to call you as a witness [because] he 
can’t be sure . . . until you’ve testified whether you’re going to testify 
truthfully or not . . . .  But in order to protect [the lawyer], . . . you will 
testify in a narrative form.100   
The court’s unstated assumption—that the lawyer could prevent the criminal 
defendant from taking the stand if the lawyer “knew” that he would commit 
perjury—is undercut by the law, by all scholarship on the topic, and by common 
                                                          
 
94
 Id. at 851-52. 
 
95
 Id. at 849-50. 
 
96
 Id. at 850. 
 
97
 Commonwealth v. Mascitti, 534 A.2d 524, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d, 546 A.2d 
619 (Pa. 1988).   
 
98
 Id. at 527. 
 
99
 Id. at 526. 
 
100
 Id. at 528 (emphasis omitted). 
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sense: a lawyer can never know what a client will do, any more than one human 
being can ever know what another human being will do on any subject.101 
Following other jurisdictions,102 the appeals court concluded that the trial judge 
had not abused his discretion in directing the defendant to testify in a narrative 
format, rather than permitting the lawyer to withdraw and declaring a mistrial.103  
Unlike the Butler court, the Mascitti court did not consider the adequacy of the 
lawyer’s knowledge of potential perjury nor the steps he had or had not taken prior 
to raising the issue with the trial judge.104  And that made sense because the lawyer 
could not have known what his client would do. 
Indeed, in People v. Johnson,105 the lawyer told the trial judge that he could not 
call his client to the stand due to “an ethical conflict.”106  Without probing the 
lawyer’s reasoning, the judge assumed that the lawyer was concerned about possible 
perjury.107  Agreeing that preventing the defendant’s testimony would be the only 
way to avoid perjury, the judge agreed with the lawyer’s approach, and the defendant 
did not testify.108  Upon his conviction, the appeals court concluded that the trial 
court’s approach had attempted an “impossible task”—determining whether the 
defendant would, indeed, perjure himself.109  Perhaps in recognition of the futility of 
ever knowing any future event, the Johnson court did not discuss the standard of 
knowledge that a lawyer would have to have before communicating his concerns to 
the trial judge.  It favored narration because the danger of perjury is reduced by 
cross-examination and impeachment.110  The court concluded that the narrative 
approach represented the “best accommodation of the competing interests” of lawyer 
and client111 and that the lower court should have used the method, rather than 
barring the defendant from testifying entirely.112 
                                                          
 
101
 Cf. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987) (holding explicitly that criminal defendant 
has constitutional right to testify on own behalf); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501, 521 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1992) (allowing narration upon lawyer’s “good faith” determination of perjury); 
Hazard, supra note 4, at 1051 (“[J]udges assume that an advocate can identify client 
perjury.”); Thrower, supra note 16, at Part III.B; Wolfram, supra note 8, at 842 (“[A]n 
attorney will rarely be in a position to determine confidently whether particular testimony is 
perjurious.”).  Putting lawyers in desperate straits, “many courts have shown little sympathy 
for the argument that an attorney is powerless in the face of client perjury.”  Id. at 837. 
 
102
 See, e.g., People v. Lowery, 366 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Fosnight, 
679 P.2d 174, 180 (Kan. 1984); People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
 
103
 Mascitti, 534 A.2d at 529. 
 
104
 Id. at n.1. 
 
105
 People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 
106
 Id. at 806. 
 
107
 Id. at 810 n.6. 
 
108
 Id. at 807. 
 
109
 Id. at 818. 
 
110
 Id. at 817. 
 
111
 Id. 
 
112
 Id. at 817-19.  Cf. Thrower, supra note 16, at Part III.B. 
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This endorsement—twenty years into the Defense Function Standards—rested on 
two obvious fallacies: (1) the ABA hates its own Standard 4-7.7, only grudgingly 
acknowledging its existence and refusing multiple times to adopt it as an official 
rule;113 and (2) a lawyer’s silent presence in the courtroom while his client perjures 
himself can hardly be characterized as refraining from offering known false 
evidence—the standards invoked by both the Model Code and the Model Rules.  The 
lawyer is there, listening to the client’s narration of a false story and not objecting or 
correcting.114  The fact that the lawyer is not directing the client’s testimony with 
questions does not remove his behavior from the clear language of the rule;115 rather, 
the lawyer is passively aiding perjury by using the narrative approach.  Neither 
Model Rule 3.3, nor its sister Rule 1.2(d) on counseling and assisting a client, 
differentiate between active and passive assistance.116  The reasonable remedial 
measure of narration is a fiction: the sin of allowing a client to perjure himself 
cannot be cured—from either an ethical or common sense perspective—by the 
lawyer’s silence at counsel table and his later omission of the testimony from closing 
argument.117  A lawyer who follows this approach—even when adopted by judges in 
the state in which he practices—opens himself to an ethics prosecution, one that 
appears would be endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.  In its landmark Nix 
v. Whiteside118 decision, in a long discussion of the range of acceptable conduct by a 
criminal defense lawyer confronted with a potentially perjurious client, and 
considering withdrawal and narration as options, the Court intoned that “in no sense” 
can a lawyer “honorably be a party to or in any way give aid to presenting known 
perjury.”119 
                                                          
 
113
 See supra Part II.A. 
 
114
 But see Wolfram, supra note 8, at 854 (recommending lawyer use corrective questions 
to rectify perjury). 
 
115
 But see Lefstein, supra note 4, at 522-36 (endorsing narrative approach, rejecting 
withdrawal, and advising lawyers to refrain from “calling” client as witness or questioning 
around perjurious matters). 
 
116
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).   
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal 
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or 
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
application of the law.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).  
 
117
 See Appel, supra note 71, at 1922 (rejecting free narrative approach); Vickrey, supra 
note 68, at 270 (stating that ABA Defense Function Standard 4-7.7 is “particularly misguided” 
in addressing the situation in which withdrawal is not possible, striking “a compromise that 
fails to achieve any of the proper objectives of the legal system”); Wolfram, supra note 8, at 
851 (identifying contradiction between ABA-endorsed “free narrative” approach and 
disciplinary cases prohibiting any cooperation in client perjury). 
 
118
 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 
119
 Id. at 171 (analyzing Sixth Amendment standards of effective assistance of counsel 
necessary for federal habeas relief, set by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  
Compare State v. Waggoner, 864 P.2d 162, 168 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (“By presenting his 
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With narration off the table as a reliable remediation measure, lawyers were left 
with three others to try: remonstration—essentially pleading with the client to tell the 
truth—withdrawal, and disclosure of the perjury.  Remonstration is always a safe bet 
from a disciplinary perspective because the lawyer will not be in danger of violating 
other ethics mandates by employing it.  The problem with it is that it is often 
ineffective, leaving the lawyer with withdrawal and disclosure as tactics to employ in 
preventing perjury and its effects.  Neither is a workable solution. 
B.  Confusion About Withdrawal 
Aside from the overarching questions about reasonable remedial measures, 
specific confusion underlies the rules on withdrawal from representation.  Neither 
Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102 nor Model Rule 3.3 mentions withdrawal as a 
step that a lawyer must take upon discovering client fraud.120  As it has developed, 
the withdrawal practice appears to be meant as a sort of release valve for the lawyer 
with a lying client, but it only adds to the unnecessary cognitive dissonance of a 
lawyer’s life already produced by the ABA’s legal ethics framework.  Many scholars 
have identified the theoretical and practical problems raised by the withdrawal 
rules.121  One of the fundamental problems is that no ABA ethics rule has ever 
required withdrawal as a response to client perjury, yet plenty of judges and 
disciplinary panels behave as if they do.  Perhaps this is because the ABA rules 
drafters and commentators seem to believe so, as well.122 
Withdrawal as a response to client perjury has its roots in a lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality.  Canon 37—the original duty of confidentiality—announced that a 
lawyer should not continue employment when he discovers that he cannot fulfill his 
obligation to his client.123  Later rules would expressly mandate withdrawal, but until 
then, lawyers could take no directive guidance from the merely aspirational canon.  
The Canons included no glossary or interpretive comments to shed any light on what 
the authors meant by “should”; indeed, it is a moral imperative only and carries no 
mandate.124 
The apparent mandate arrived in 1969 with the Model Code.  Neither the Model 
Code’s nor the later Model Rules’ duties of client confidentiality and candor to the 
court anticipate a lawyer’s withdrawal on the basis of his inability to fulfill either 
obligation.  Both ethics systems, though, do capture an overriding duty of 
withdrawal in separate rules: Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2-110 and Model Rule 
                                                          
client’s testimony in narrative form, counsel did not assist the perjury by his client.”), with 
People v. Andrades, 828 N.E.2d 599, 604 n.3 (N.Y. 2005) (expressly rejecting narrative 
approach as incompatible with lawyer’s obligation to reveal fraud to court). 
 
120
 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1974); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002). 
 
121
 See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 4, at 1538-40; Monroe H. Freedman, Professional 
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. 
REV. 1469, 1475-77 (1966); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 917; Lefstein, supra note 4, at 525-27; 
Wolfram, supra note 8, at 855. 
 
122
 Cf., e.g., ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, Legal Background (1983). 
 
123
 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908) (amended 1937). 
 
124
 See WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 778 (1949). 
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1.16 both express rules governing mandatory and permissive withdrawal.125  Both 
mandate withdrawal if continued employment causes the lawyer to violate another 
disciplinary rule: 
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if 
required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer 
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if 
. . . [h]e knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result 
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.126 
“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, 
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result 
in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law . . . .”127 
The comments following Model Rule 3.3 advise a lawyer to seek to withdraw 
from the representation of a client who insists on testifying falsely: “[i]f perjured 
testimony or false evidence has been offered, . . . the advocate should seek to 
withdraw if that will remedy the situation.”128  This 1983 comment retains the old 
Canons’ suggestion that the lawyer should seek to withdraw—not that he must.129  
The 2002 version is similarly vague: “the advocate’s proper course is to . . . seek the 
client’s cooperation with respect to the withdrawal . . . .”130 
These non-binding supplements to the Model Rules all treat withdrawal as if it 
were the cure-all for a lawyer with a lying client.  But the ABA’s efforts to prevent 
or remediate perjury by removing the lawyer from the scene suffer from multiple 
broad-spectrum failures.  As do the rules on client confidentiality and candor toward 
a tribunal, the statements on withdrawal conflict with other ethical principles and 
with everyday legal practice.131 
1.  The Withdrawal Rules Are Internally Contradictory 
One fatal conflict is that Model Code Disciplinary Rule 2-110 and Model Rule 
1.16 are contradictory, both on their faces and as applied; thus, they are 
unconstitutionally ambiguous.132  Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(2) requires withdrawal 
if a lawyer “knows” that continued representation will result in a violation of a 
“Disciplinary Rule,”133 but DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) permits withdrawal if the client 
                                                          
 
125
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1969) (amended 1974); MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1974); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 
(1983) (amended 2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002). 
 
126
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974). 
 
127
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
128
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
129
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983) (amended 2002). 
 
130
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002). 
 
131
 For a discussion of the several ways that the rules on client confidentiality and candor 
toward a tribunal conflict with each other and with other ethical and Constitutional principles, 
see generally Thrower, supra note 16. 
 
132
 See id. at Part IV. 
 
133
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974).  But see Wolfram, 
supra note 8, at 832 (asserting that the Model Code does not mandate withdrawal when 
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“seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.”134  Comparably, Model Rule 
1.16(a)(1) requires withdrawal if the representation “will result” in violation of 
another Rule of Professional Conduct,135 but Rule 1.16(b) permits withdrawal if the 
lawyer “reasonably believes” that the client’s course of action is “criminal or 
fraudulent.”136 
There’s more.  The behavioral choice provided by Model Code DR 2-110(B) and 
2-110(C) is dependent on verb tenses that have no meaningful difference.  DR 2-
110(B)(2) mandates withdrawal if the lawyer “knows or it is obvious that his 
continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.”137  DR 2-
110(C), on the other hand, permits withdrawal if the lawyer’s “continued 
employment is likely to result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule.”138 
In parsing the ambiguities, the lawyer’s level of knowledge is a good place to 
begin.  The Model Code requires that a lawyer base his withdrawal on his ability to 
predict the future: “will” versus “likely.”  The Model Rule requires that a lawyer 
make his withdrawal decision based on the level of his knowledge of his client’s bad 
behavior—knowledge (“will”) versus reasonable belief.  Both of these standards are 
precursors to the impenetrable morass of Model Rule 3.3’s regime of mandating or 
permitting a lawyer’s response to his client’s perjury based on his actual knowledge 
versus his reasonable belief of the lies.139  As with Rule 3.3, Rule 1.16’s system of 
mandatory and permissive withdrawal based on the lawyer’s ability to read tea 
leaves is unworkable.140 
Similarly, no meaningful difference exists between “will result” and “is likely to 
result.”  “Will” signifies future certainty or likelihood.141  “Likely” implies 
probability,142 and, hence, also refers to the future.  If a measurable difference 
between the two exists, a mathematician—not a lawyer—would have to make the 
call.  Lawyers, not traditionally trained in the science of statistics, cannot justifiably 
be held to pinpoint-level accuracy in discerning the difference between the two.  
This false choice of action based on the lawyer’s level of knowledge is a pervasive 
theme in modern ethics frameworks.143 
                                                          
lawyer is surprised by client perjury, despite conclusions drawn in several disciplinary 
opinions). 
 
134
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) (1974) (emphasis added). 
 
135
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2002).  
 
136
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(2) (2002).  
 
137
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974) (emphasis added). 
 
138
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(2) (1974) (emphasis added). 
 
139
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002). 
 
140
 For more on the unworkability of Rule 3.3’s scheme, see generally Thrower, supra note 
16. 
 
141
 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1968 (4th ed. 2000). 
 
142
 Id. at 1014. 
 
143
 See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 4, at Part I.B.1; Freedman, supra note 39, at 1940-46; 
Goldberg, supra note 4, at Part II.B; Green, supra note 4; Lefstein, supra note 4, at Part II.C; 
Thrower, supra note 16, at Part III.B; Wolfram, supra note 8, at Part V.A. 
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Ambiguities also infect the governance of the lawyer’s response.  The difference 
in the lawyer’s withdrawal approach depends on the type of bad act by the client.  
Because falsehoods are the subjects of Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102 and 
Model Rule 3.3, a client’s perjury would violate a Disciplinary Rule and a Rule of 
Professional Conduct and would, therefore, mandate the lawyer’s withdrawal under 
DR 2-110(B) and Rule 1.16(a).  Because perjury is a crime in every state in the 
country,144 the lawyer’s withdrawal would merely be permitted—not mandated—
under DR 2-110(C) and Rule 1.16(b), which cover an “illegal course of conduct” and 
a “criminal or fraudulent” course of conduct, respectively.145  So with regard to 
perjury, the question of an ethics rule violation on the one hand and a criminal act on 
the other is a distinction without a difference. 
Because a client’s perjury is criminal conduct that constitutes an ethics violation 
when known to the lawyer, this one act invokes two rules simultaneously.146  Given 
that mandatory withdrawal is the sanctioned response to a violation of another ethics 
rule,147 but permissive withdrawal is the sanctioned response to criminal or 
fraudulent conduct,148 a lawyer could reasonably be expected to draw the conclusion 
that withdrawal is either mandated or permitted under Rule 3.3 for client perjury.  
Faced with two equally viable choices under the ethics rules, a lawyer should be able 
to choose the permissive rule and decide not to withdraw, yet this analysis will lead 
to trouble for him.  It is more of the same unresolvable conflict that the rules present 
between keeping a client’s confidence and being candid with the court.149 
In re A.,150 decided under the Model Code, aptly represents the sheer injustice of 
placing that burden on a lawyer.  In that case, a son had committed welfare fraud in 
handling his declining mother’s finances.151  After receiving payments on her behalf 
and keeping them unlawfully, an attack of conscience led him to arrange to repay the 
funds.152  His mother died before he could accomplish the reimbursement.153 
                                                          
 
144
 Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) 
(“Although Rule 3.3(a)(2), unlike 3.3(a)(4), does not specifically refer to perjury or false 
evidence, it would require an irrational reading of the language: ‘a criminal or fraudulent act 
by the client,’ to exclude false testimony by the client.  While broadly written to cover all 
crimes or frauds a client may commit during the course of the proceeding, Rule 3.3(a)(2), in 
the context of the whole of Rule 3.3, certainly includes perjury.”). 
 
145
 This dance between the levels of a lawyer’s knowledge and the concomitant level of his 
requirement to act models the tease posed by other ethics rules on the lawyer’s knowledge and 
reasonable belief.  See Thrower, supra note 16. 
 
146
 From a purely practical perspective, the mandatory rule probably swallows the 
permissive rule: the lawyer must withdraw when confronted by client perjury.  Still, this is not 
what the rules say. 
 
147
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1969) (amended 1974); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2002). 
 
148
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) (1969) (amended 1974); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(2) (2002).  
 
149
 See Thrower, supra note 16. 
 
150
 In re A., 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976). 
 
151
 Id. at 480. 
 
152
 Id. 
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The son’s divorce case proceeded simultaneously, and the judge there asked the 
son a question indicating that the judge did not realize that the mother had passed.154  
When the son permitted the judge to keep his erroneous impression, the son’s lawyer 
stayed silent.155  The lawyer rightly understood that his client would be subject to 
prosecution for welfare fraud if he had corrected the judge’s misimpression.156  He 
remained quiet to avoid revealing a confidence that would result in his client’s 
exposure to prosecution, an outcome certainly “detrimental” to the client and 
required to be kept confidential under Model Code Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B).157  
Later, the lawyer urged his client to correct the judge’s misimpression that the 
mother was still living, and the client refused; he did not want to be prosecuted for 
welfare fraud.158 
The first-level disciplinary trial committee in Oregon found that the lawyer had 
violated his duty to reveal his client’s fraud to the court, but the prosecuting bar 
counsel actually urged the review committee to find that the lawyer’s violation was a 
failure to withdraw, not a failure to disclose.159  Because DR 7-102, the Model 
Code’s candor rule, did not require withdrawal in the face of perjury, bar counsel 
must have been relying on withdrawal rule DR 2-110(B)(2), though the opinion 
gives no indication of the rule on which the trial committee rested its decision.160 
In a fractured opinion recommending a public reprimand, the members of the 
Oregon review committee revealed broad confusion over the duty to withdraw.161  
Two members concluded that the lawyer had participated in his client’s intentional 
misdirection of the court.  Those members opined that, at a minimum, the lawyer 
“should” have withdrawn from representation because he knew that the client had 
misled the court, and the client confidentiality rule must yield to the candor rule.162  
They offered no rule in support of their analysis.163 
Another member of the review committee concurred in the lawyer’s reprimand, 
finding that the lawyer had been duty-bound to insist that the client permit him to 
correct the deception and, “failing that, to withdraw from the case.”164  This panel 
member recognized that the lawyer had an ethical duty to not “blow the whistle” on 
his client, but he was uncomfortable that the lawyer had not “immediately 
                                                          
 
153
 Id.  
 
154
 Id. at 481. 
 
155
 Id. at 481-82. 
 
156
 Id. at 483-84. 
 
157
 Id. at 484. 
 
158
 Id. at 482-83. 
 
159
 Id. 
 
160
 Id. 
 
161
 See id. at 484-85. 
 
162
 Id. at 484. 
 
163
 See id. 
 
164
 Id.  
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disassociate[d] himself from [the deception].”165  As did his concurring colleagues, 
this member offered no rule in support of his analysis.166 
Two other members of the committee dissented.  They concluded that the 
lawyer’s greater duty was not to the court but was to his client through the 
maintenance of the confidential relationship and the unbridled advocacy of his 
client’s interests.167  The dissenters drily noted that the lawyer “would have been 
criticized by someone regardless of what he did.”168 
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court applied DR 2-110(B)(2), which requires 
withdrawal if the lawyer “‘knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will 
result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.’”169  The court seemed to think that the 
only thing obvious about the lawyer’s situation was that he could not simultaneously 
satisfy both confidentiality and candor rules.  Given that Oregon’s version of the 
candor rule did not require withdrawal upon the discovery of perjury, the court 
concluded that “it certainly could not have been ‘obvious’ . . . that the [lawyer’s] 
continued employment would violate a disciplinary rule, . . . [t]herefore, the accused 
was not [r]equired to withdraw under DR2-110(B)(2).”170 
The court dismissed the complaint,171 but by that point, the lawyer had had to 
endure the expense, the professional embarrassment, and the trauma of a disciplinary 
inquiry, hearing, and appeal.  Lawyers are not clairvoyant.  Rules that are 
inscrutable, that force an instant choice on lawyers that disciplinary panelists and 
judges cannot make with certainty after months of consideration, violate 
fundamental principles of due process.172 
2.  The Model Rules’ Comments Conflict with Each Other and with the Rules 
From whence does the ironclad idea of withdrawal upon perjury come?  It comes 
from the corona formed by the non-binding ABA Ethics Committee opinions and the 
explanatory comments.  This corona exposes another deep flaw in the Model Rules’ 
scheme: the allegedly explanatory comments exacerbate the confusion regarding 
withdrawal and its aftermath.  Supplied by the Model Rules drafters as non-binding 
explanatory helpers, the comments are not the rules, but are meant to illustrate the 
rules.173  Nowhere do the actual rules state that the comments may amplify a 
lawyer’s obligations, and, yet, this is exactly what the comments trend toward.  
Model Rule 3.3 Comment 11 (1983) and Model Rule 3.3 Comment 15 (2002) 
identify withdrawal as among the reasonable remedial measures that a lawyer should 
                                                          
 
165
 Id. 
 
166
 See id.  DR 2-110(B) seems likely to have been on this committee member’s mind. 
 
167
 Id. at 484-85. 
 
168
 Id. at 485. 
 
169
 Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1974)).  
 
170
 Id. at 486. 
 
171
 Id. at 487. 
 
172
 Cf. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 845 (stating few cases in Oregon cast such an extreme 
burden on lawyers, yet they are prosecuted anyway). 
 
173
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope (2002). 
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take in order to rectify client fraud.  These comments conflict with the comments 
following Rule 1.16 on withdrawal.174  Three examples reveal the depth of the flaw. 
a.  The Comments Toggle Between Mandate and Permission 
Comment 15 to the 2002 Model Rule 3.3 advises that if a lawyer requests leave 
to withdraw under Rule 1.16(b)’s permissive withdrawal rule regarding his client’s 
“criminal or fraudulent” conduct, the lawyer “may” reveal information relating to the 
representation “only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with” the duty of 
candor.175  What does this language mean?  “Compliance” with the duty of candor 
implies a mandate and is at odds with the comment’s use of the permissive “may.”  
What “extent” would be “reasonably necessary” to comply with the duty?  Would a 
revelation of information to comply with all of the reasonable remedial measures be 
permitted, or would a lawyer have to carefully tailor his revelation to the “extent 
reasonably necessary” to succeed only on his motion for withdrawal?176 
Given that the revelation of confidential information is typically viewed by 
courts, clients, and lawyers as an extreme step, why did the drafters choose to bury 
this nugget in a comment meant to “explain[] and illustrate[] the meaning and 
purpose of the [r]ule”?177  In dissenting from an ABA opinion on a related topic, one 
member of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
bitterly predicted that “[b]y making mandatory what is at most permissive, the 
opinion has thus given aid and comfort to those who would increase the exposure of 
otherwise innocent lawyers to both disciplinary and civil penalties . . . .”178 
b.  The Comments Inadvertently Raise the Question of Whether Withdrawal Really Is 
Required 
Comment 10179 identifies withdrawal as one of the reasonable remedial measures 
that a lawyer “shall” take upon discovering the use of false evidence, but Comment 
15180 backtracks from the idea that withdrawal is obligated after a lawyer discloses 
perjury.181  It notes, instead, that Rule 1.16(a) requires a lawyer to seek to withdraw 
once he has complied with the duty of candor if that compliance causes his 
relationship with his client to deteriorate.182  This implies that the lawyer could have 
                                                          
 
174
 Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) 
(dissent) (noting Ethics Committee’s dysfunction in relying on unenforceable comment to 
Model Rule 1.6 as support for its insistence on mandating “noisy withdrawal” in face of client 
fraud, when text to Rule 1.6 mandates no such duty). 
 
175
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002). 
 
176
 See Crystal, supra note 4, at 1543. 
 
177
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope para. 21 (2002); see Rutherglen, supra note 
4, 267-68 (favoring withdrawal over disclosure, explaining that Rule 3.3 disclosure 
compromises lawyer’s role as advocate). 
 
178
 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) (dissent). 
 
179
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2002). 
 
180
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002). 
 
181
 See also Crystal, supra note 4, at 1539. 
 
182
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (2002). 
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complied with Rule 3.3 without withdrawing, the withdrawal becoming relevant only 
if that compliance later destroys the attorney-client relationship.  Accordingly, if the 
drafters did not really consider withdrawal to be a required action, Comment 10’s 
inclusion of it in a list of “remedial measures” that lawyers “shall take” causes 
confusion and can lead to disciplinary scrutiny.183 
c.  The Comments Are Confused About Lawyer-Client Relations 
Comment 15’s loose use of mandatory language is another problem for lawyers.  
The comment states that the lawyer “may be required” by Rule 1.16(a) to seek 
withdrawal upon the deterioration of the lawyer-client relationship,184 when Rule 
1.16 mandates nothing of the sort.  Rule 1.16 says withdrawal is mandatory only 
upon (1) actions that result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law; (2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition that impairs his ability to 
represent his client; or (3) the client’s discharge of the lawyer.185  All of the other 
enumerated situations lead only to the lawyer’s permissive withdrawal, and the 
disintegration of the attorney-client relationship is not among the reasons listed.186 
3.  The Rules Conflict with Actual Legal Practice 
A final flaw demonstrating the failure of the rules governing withdrawal is the 
infrequency of withdrawal as a factual matter.  The ethics rules’ blithe treatment of 
withdrawal as a lawyer’s sword or shield indicates that the rules drafters had little 
practical experience with the issue in a real courtroom.  While the comments to the 
candor rule appear to accept withdrawal as a foregone conclusion,187 actual judges 
are singularly unwilling to permit a lawyer to withdraw once a case has made it past 
its initial stages.188  Rule 1.16 Comment 3 hints at some recognition of the 
contradiction between the rule and reality: “[d]ifficulty [in obtaining court approval] 
                                                          
 
183
 Scholars are divided on the issue of whether withdrawal in the face of perjury is even a 
good idea.  See, e.g., Lefstein, supra note 4, at 525-27, 549-50 (rejecting withdrawal as 
solution to client perjury because it inevitably requires lawyer to disclose confidential 
information in service of withdrawal request); Wolfram, supra note 8, at 854, 860-62 
(recommending use of “corrective questions” during examination and recommending 
withdrawal for civil action); see also In re A., 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976). 
 
184
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 15 (2002). 
 
185
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (2002). 
 
186
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002). 
 
187
 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 10 & 15 (2002). 
 
188
 See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 8, at 860.  Professor Wolfram’s investigation revealed 
that judges permit withdrawal in criminal defense cases only if the trial has not yet begun.  Id. 
at 855; see also People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (refusing lawyer’s 
motion to withdraw but allowed lawyer to “disassociate” himself from defendant’s testimony 
by ordering narration); Commonwealth v. Mascitti, 534 A.2d 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d, 
546 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1988) (denying lawyer’s motion to withdraw from representation of 
criminal defendant he believed would testify falsely); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (denying lawyer’s motion to withdraw made before jury selection had 
begun); State v. Trapp, 368 N.E.2d 1278, 1281-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (holding trial court 
erred in refusing to grant any of lawyer’s five motions to withdraw when his criminal defense 
client insisted on presenting alibi based on perjury). 
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may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client’s demand that the lawyer 
engage in unprofessional conduct.”189  The rules drafters seem to have recognized 
that lawyers do not come by withdrawal easily, and yet they made withdrawal the 
focal point of the reasonable remedial measures, thus setting up a behavioral 
framework that is destined to fail and lead to lawyer discipline. 
A lawyer’s primary difficulty in gaining leave to withdraw is the uncertainty of 
how much to tell the judge in order to persuade him of the merits of the withdrawal 
request.  What resources are available to a lawyer to guide him in clarifying this 
uncertainty?  Under the plain language of the 1974 version of the Model Code, a 
lawyer may not disclose his client’s privileged communications, even to rectify fraud 
on a court.190  It seems unlikely, then, that a Model Code jurisdiction would permit a 
lawyer seeking to withdraw to reveal client confidences in the service of his 
withdrawal explanation.  The Model Rules, which do require disclosure of client 
confidences in the case of perjury, place the heavy burden on the lawyer to assess 
accurately when disclosure is “necessary” to that rectification or face discipline for 
making the wrong call: if the lawyer knows that he is responsible for submitting 
false evidence, he “shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal.”191  Jurisdictions that follow unadopted Defense Function 
Standard 4-7.7192 may permit the lawyer to withdraw prior to trial, but the lawyer 
may not tell the court why he is seeking to withdraw.193 
Despite the Model Rules’ mandate of a lawyer’s disclosure of client confidences 
to rectify perjury, a court will often deny a lawyer’s request to withdraw when his 
reason is to avoid involvement with his client’s perjury: courts want to avoid the 
appointment of another lawyer and the inevitable delay of the trial and, perhaps, 
another withdrawal down the road when substitute counsel learns of his client’s 
intended perjury.194  Accordingly, in order to dance on the head of this pin, a lawyer 
must usually equivocate and tell the judge only that an “ethical problem” exists or 
that “professional considerations” require termination, not that he suspects client 
perjury.195  How often this undifferentiated excuse will convince a judge to permit 
                                                          
 
189
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 3 (1983) (amended 2002); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 3 (2002); see also Crystal, supra note 4, at 1539; 
Rutherglen, supra note 4, at 269. 
 
190
 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1974); see also infra Part II.C. 
 
191
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002); see infra Part II.C. 
 
192
 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 4-7.7 (1971); see supra Part II.A. 
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 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 4-7.7(b) (1971); see Vickrey, supra note 68, at 270. 
 
194
 For a description of this withdrawal-appointment circle see Lefstein, supra note 4, at 
525-26. 
 
195
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 3 (2002); cf. United States v. Henkel, 
799 F.2d 369, 370 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that lawyer moved to withdraw because he could 
not “professionally . . . proceed”); People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 806-07 (Ct. App. 
1998) (stating that lawyer explained he could not call client to stand due to “ethical conflict”); 
People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981) (holding that request to withdraw should state 
that lawyer had “irreconcilable conflict” with client and nothing more).  But see Wolfram, 
 
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
806 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:781 
 
the request is left to the reader’s skeptical consideration.196  And because Rule 
1.16(c) comes down on the side of continued representation when the judge denies a 
motion to withdraw,197 that denial places the lawyer in the position of having to 
choose between following a court order—continue the representation—and 
following a rule of professional responsibility—do not participate in client perjury; 
he cannot fulfill both.  This is the essence of unconstitutional ambiguity, a violation 
of due process.198 
Despite Rule 3.3 commentary’s identification of withdrawal as part of the 
reasonable remedial measures that constitute a lawyer’s “proper course” upon his 
discovery of client perjury, the rules and their comments are utterly divorced from 
the realities of withdrawal in an actual courtroom.199  Perhaps understandably, judges 
usually proceed in their courtrooms on the assumption that the ethics rules are 
subordinate to their orders, often mandating that the lawyer put the client on the 
stand or disclose confidential information, or refusing to permit the lawyer to 
withdraw from representation.200  One scholar articulated the clear dilemma faced by 
every criminal defense lawyer at some point in his career: if a judge directs a lawyer 
to proceed with direct examination, the lawyer “will have to choose between obeying 
                                                          
supra note 8, at 863-66.  Professor Crystal notes that other popular phrases such as “conflict 
of interest” and “privileged reason” also function as tip-offs to a court that the lawyer’s client 
plans to commit perjury.  Crystal, supra note 4, at 1543. 
 
196
 See, e.g., Henkel, 799 F.2d at 370 (denying withdrawal when lawyer could not 
“professionally . . . proceed”); Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806 (denying withdrawal when 
lawyer explained he could not call client to stand due to “ethical conflict”); In re Decker, 606 
N.E.2d 1094 (Ill. 1992) (ignoring lawyer’s motion to withdraw “due to professional and 
personal ethics” and fielding several other motions and subpoena demanding privileged 
information, ultimately leading to entry of contempt citation and order of imprisonment 
against lawyer seeking to protect client confidences); People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1992) (ruling against lawyer’s motion for withdrawal based on “ethical 
considerations”).  In the same vein, providing no reason at all ensures denial of the lawyer’s 
motion to withdraw.  See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).  Professor 
Lefstein argues that seeking withdrawal places the lawyer in a dangerous position because in 
explaining why he wants to withdraw, the lawyer usually discloses confidential information.  
Lefstein, supra note 4, at 549. 
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 Model Rule 1.16(c) orders lawyers to “comply with applicable law requiring notice to 
or permission of a [court] when terminating a representation.”  It also mandates the lawyer to 
continue his representation when a court denies his withdrawal request.  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2002). 
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 See Thrower, supra note 16, at Part IV. 
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 Professor Lefstein raises the concern that a judge will not permit withdrawal.  Lefstein, 
supra note 4, at 547; cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 
(1992) (dissent) (criticizing majority opinion mandating “noisy withdrawal” as “an artificial 
construct divorced from the reality predicated by the opinion’s own hypothetical”). 
 
200
 Rubin v. State, 490 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Decker, 606 N.E.2d at 1108; 
Lucas v. State, 572 S.E.2d 274 (S.C. 2002); In re Goodwin, 305 S.E.2d 578, 580 (S.C. 1983); 
see Wolfram, supra note 8, at 832 (lamenting court’s divergence from principles of 
professional responsibility as described in ethics rules); id. at 838 (noting some courts’ 
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information). 
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the court’s order and complying with the ethical proscription not to assist a witness 
in presenting what [the lawyer] knows to be perjury.”201 
Two South Carolina cases, decided under different ethics codes, illustrate the 
judicial indifference to this legal dilemma.  In the first, a Model Code case, a public 
defender became aware, during the course of a criminal trial, that her client planned 
to perjure himself.202  She immediately moved to withdraw.203  During an in camera 
hearing to discuss her motion, the lawyer did not disclose her concerns of perjury 
but, instead, explained that Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B) required her withdrawal to 
avoid her violation of DR 7-102(A)(4) through the presentation of perjured 
testimony.204  The judge denied her motion to withdraw and ordered the lawyer to 
proceed with the trial.205  When she refused, the judge ordered her trial partner to 
proceed, and he likewise refused.206  The judge held both lawyers in contempt of 
court for disobeying his order to proceed207 and enjoined the county public 
defender’s office from paying their salaries.208  On appeal, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge had not erred by ordering the lawyers 
to proceed, nor by holding them in contempt, rationalizing that a withdrawal would 
only have resulted in a continuous stream of lawyers moving, in succession, to 
withdraw, thus depriving the defendant of his right to counsel.209  “Worse, new 
counsel might fail to recognize the problem and unwittingly present false 
evidence.”210  How an unwitting participation in perjury would be worse than a 
strongly suspected participation was a question that the court did not address. 
The court apparently found it preferable to force the current lawyers into 
knowingly presenting false evidence than for a successor lawyer to do the same 
unknowingly.  The court breezily noted that “motions to withdraw must lie within 
the sound discretion of the trial judge,” who “must balance the need for the orderly 
administration of justice with the fact that an irreconcilable conflict exists between 
counsel and the accused.”211  The lawyers simply had no choice but to comply with 
court orders.212  The supreme court expressed sympathy for the defendant, the trial 
judge, and any substitute counsel but had little concern for the two lawyers who had 
tried to avoid participating in perjury, gamely protected their client’s confidences, 
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and suffered the professional detriment of being held in contempt and sacrificing a 
paycheck.213 
Decided under the Model Rules’ version of the duties of confidentiality and 
candor, Lucas v. State214 similarly supported a trial judge who had denied a lawyer’s 
motion to withdraw to avoid presenting perjury.  Turning a blind eye to the ethics 
rules’ insistence on a lawyer’s withdrawal from representation of a perjurious client, 
South Carolina’s high court recognized that the same possibility of a withdrawal 
cycle existed under the Model Rules as had supported its decision in the Model 
Code-based Goodwin contempt case twenty years before.215 
Although commentators posit that withdrawal from civil cases is a smoother 
drive than is withdrawal from criminal cases,216 Norris v. Lee217 demonstrates that the 
grass is not always greener on the civil side of the road.  In Norris, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers moved to withdraw because they had come to doubt their clients’ veracity.218  
The court denied their motion.219  While warning the lawyers that they could 
professionally neither adduce nor argue false evidence,220 the judge told them quite 
plainly to set aside their squeamishness221 and get on with their job: “I recognize that 
for the young lawyer or law student, these realities sometimes make for a hard 
swallow.  But that is the way the law is practiced in the real world . . . .”222 
In the real world, the lawyer is usually just out of luck.  When the judge does not 
want his show disrupted, the lawyer must swallow hard and forge ahead with his 
devil’s choice, but if the lawyer chooses a path with which judge or bar counsel 
disagrees, he faces a contempt citation from the judge or disciplinary charges from 
bar counsel.  One cryptic sentence, found at the end of Comment 7 to Model Rule 
3.3, acknowledges that “even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will 
be false,” the lawyer’s obligation to act in one way under the ethics rules is 
subordinate to a judge’s order to act in the opposite way.223  This purported 
subordination of the ethics rules has not prevented subsequent disciplinary actions or 
appellate scrutiny of those lawyers’ actions through ineffective assistance of counsel 
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and fair trial claims.224  Indeed, one state supreme court has expressly announced that 
lawyers should invite a contempt citation from the bench as a reasonable method of 
resolving this dilemma.225  Other courts have imposed the contempt sanction on 
lawyers seeking to fulfill their professional obligations, even when the lawyers had 
sought certiorari review and pursued every procedural avenue available to have their 
ethical concerns heard.226 
Why the lawyer should be the one judicial participant to have to sacrifice even an 
hour of his livelihood or reputation while the judge and client insist on their 
prerogatives is unclear.  Dismay can be the only response to anyone who thinks it 
appropriate for a lawyer to bear the burden of these poorly drafted and unresolvable 
rules.227  No matter which way a lawyer turns in a possible withdrawal situation, the 
ethics rules present him with a conflict.  Of all the tics and conflicts in the ethics 
rules, the conflict between the withdrawal rules as written and the mechanics of 
withdrawal in the courtroom may be the saddest and most preventable example of 
the drafters’ disconnect between reality and their expectations of proper lawyerly 
conduct.  Their selection of withdrawal as a “reasonable remedial measure” to avoid 
or correct perjury is one of the ethics frameworks’ most notable failures—both 
unreasonable and unremediative. 
C.  Confusion About Disclosure 
The directive that a lawyer inform on his lying client in order to rectify fraud on 
a court may be the single biggest producer of cognitive dissonance in the entire 
ethics enterprise.  Although the direct conflict between maintaining a client’s 
confidences and disclosing his fraud has existed since the first written American 
ethics code, lawyers have never found a way to fulfill these opposing requirements 
simultaneously, and the ABA has never produced a cogent framework, or 
explanation, for how they can.228 
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 See Thrower, supra note 16. 
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1.  The Disclosure Rules Conflict with Each Other 
The 1908 Canon of Professional Ethics 37 required a lawyer to “preserve his 
client’s confidences,” while Canon 29 required the lawyer to reveal perjury to 
authorities, and Canon 41 required him to disclose that his client has committed 
fraud or deception.229  In 1953, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility attempted to resolve this conflict and concluded that the 
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality overrode his duty to reveal fraud or deception and 
his duty to disclose perjury.230  Formal Opinion 287, interpreting Canons 29, 37, and 
41, stood for the proposition that a lawyer must not disclose his client’s perjury from 
either a civil case that has been completed or a criminal trial in progress, but he must 
withdraw from the representation.231  While the opinion did choose one ethical 
principle over another, like all ABA opinions, 287 carried no precedential weight in 
a disciplinary hearing, so it could provide no cover for the lawyer accused of 
violating one rule in the service of the other.232 
Sixteen years after the appearance of Opinion 287, the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-102 forbade a lawyer from 
“[k]nowingly [using] perjured testimony or false evidence.”233  In the same vein, 
when the lawyer had information that “clearly established” that the client had 
perpetrated a fraud on the court during the course of the representation—this 
presumably included perjury—the lawyer was mandated to “reveal the fraud to the 
affected person or tribunal” if the client would not.234  Conversely, Disciplinary Rule 
4-101 required a lawyer to maintain his client’s confidences and secrets.235  So 
despite Formal Opinion 287’s choice of confidentiality over honesty, the lawyer’s 
Code-mandated obligation remained servant to two masters—confidentiality and 
honesty—each of which demanded sole fealty. 
For five years, lawyers in Model Code states labored under this impossible 
situation, until the ABA amended DR 7-102 to exempt from a lawyer’s disclosure 
duty any information that was protected as a “privileged communication.”236  What 
does “privileged communication” include?  DR 7-102 gave no definition and no 
examples of the term.  DR 4-101 on confidentiality defines “confidence” as falling 
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within the attorney-client privilege;237 perhaps the drafters of the 1974 amendment 
meant for DR 7-102 to capture “confidences,” but not secrets.  Without a standard 
written into the rule, lawyers were on their own in navigating.  Why the drafters did 
not use “confidence” or “confidence or secret,” rather than “privileged 
communication,” in Disciplinary Rule 7 is anyone’s guess.  The context of the rules 
provides no clue.  The bottom line, by 1974, was that the Model Code gave lawyers 
three levels of information about which they had to keep quiet at different times: 
confidences, secrets, and privileged communications.  Only two of those terms came 
with definitions, leaving lawyers in the dark about what the 1974 amendment 
required of them.238 
Pressed into action by the deficiencies of the Code, the ABA Standing 
Committee issued Opinion 341 considering the meaning and reach of the 1974 
amendment to the disclosure rule.  It characterizes the amended disciplinary rule as 
“reinstat[ing] the essence of Opinion 287,” making it “unthinkable . . . that a lawyer 
should be subject to disciplinary action for failing to reveal information [that] by law 
is not to be revealed without the consent of the client,”239 and proclaiming that “the 
lawyer is not now in that untenable position.”240  Opinion 341 concludes that the 
term “privileged communication” in DR 7-102 includes both confidences and secrets 
protected by DR 4-101241—all confidential information gained in the course of the 
professional relationship.242 
Unfortunately, the Committee did not leave well enough alone.  It continued its 
exposition on the importance of confidentiality, stating that “it is clear that there has 
long been an accommodation in favor of preserving confidences either through 
practice or interpretation. . . .  The tradition [of preserving confidences] . . . should 
take precedence, in all but the most serious cases, over the duty [of disclosure of 
perjury].”243  This dicta, likely included for emphasis but with no thought for impact, 
would leave unanswered the relevant question in every instance when confidentiality 
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clashes with honesty: what, precisely, would be the “most serious cases” in which 
the confidential information must take a backseat to disclosure?244 
Another conflict between the rules relates to past fraud and future fraud.  
Disciplinary Rule 7-102 limits its reach to already-committed perjury or fraud: the 
rule states that a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client 
“perpetrated” a fraud in or out of court shall take action, including disclosure, except 
when the information is protected as privileged.245  On the other hand, DR 4-101 
permits a lawyer to reveal his client’s intention “to commit a [future] crime and the 
information necessary to prevent the crime.”246  One rule mandates the disclosure, 
while the other permits it.  The rules did not explain why past fraud was subject to 
mandatory disclosure but present and future frauds were not.  But one thing seemed 
clear after the 1974 amendment and the 1975 Opinion 341: the attorney-client 
privilege protected from revelation any communication made by a client to his 
lawyer regarding past criminal activity, even if that activity had happened during an 
interaction with law enforcement or court personnel.247  Indeed, if a client told a 
lawyer about his fraud committed before the representation began, the lawyer 
certainly would think that Disciplinary Rule 4-101 obligated him to keep that 
information confidential and not disclose it under pain of discipline.248  Tell that to 
Camelia Casby. 
In State v. Casby,249 a criminal action against a lawyer for attorney misconduct, 
the police arrested a Peter Spedevick on vehicle offenses.250  Peter falsely identified 
himself to the arresting officer as Ben Spedevick, Peter’s brother.251  Peter called his 
lawyer, Ms. Casby, from jail.  Lawyer Casby had previously done legal work for 
Peter.252  She arranged for his release from jail, signing papers identifying him and 
signed by him as Ben Spedevick.253  She drove Peter home, told him what her bill 
would be, and considered her services ended.254 
“Peter, as Ben, appeared in court alone for his arraignment.”255  Later, before his 
pre-trial hearing, he called Lawyer Casby for advice in negotiating a plea.256  The 
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lawyer called the prosecutor about the “Spedevick case,” though at the trial, the 
secretary’s message slip read “Ben Spedevick.”257  Later that day, the lawyer 
negotiated a disposition.258  Her confirming letter to the prosecutor referred to her 
client as “Mr. Spedevick.”259  Using the letter, Peter handled the pre-trial hearing 
alone, pled guilty as “Ben,” and received fines for his offenses.260 
The lawyer was later prosecuted under a misdemeanor statute for attorney 
misconduct in deceiving a court.261  At her trial, she claimed that she did not learn 
until over a week after the pre-trial hearing that Peter even had a brother named 
Ben.262  The Minnesota Supreme Court found sufficient evidence that she had had 
actual knowledge of Peter’s use of Ben’s name by the time she arranged the 
disposition with the prosecutor.263  Further, the court rejected her argument that even 
if she had been part of Peter’s deceit, both the attorney-client privilege and the code 
of professional ethics precluded her from disclosing Peter’s true identity.264  It 
likewise rejected the lawyer’s argument that her client’s fraud was a past act by the 
time she discovered it, so it received no protection under either ethics or evidence 
code.265  It reasoned that, not only was Peter’s activity a continuing, not a past, 
deceit, but the lawyer also did not receive the information about his identity through 
her work for him, so the attorney-client privilege did not cover her knowledge.266  
The Minnesota court felt in no way bound by the ABA Ethics Committee’s 
pronouncement that a lawyer’s discipline for maintaining her client’s confidence was 
“unthinkable.”267  Quite to the contrary, Ms. Casby was placed in exactly that 
“untenable position”268 and was convicted.269 
Part of the problem with the confidence/disclosure conundrum is that lawyers 
receive almost no information from avenues other than the representation of their 
clients, so in reality, the confidentiality rule covers very little information that would 
not be subject to apparent protection.  By the time the ABA revised the Model Code 
into the Model Rules, its high value for a lawyer’s confidence-keeping, expressed in 
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Opinions 287 and 341, had given way to a growing insistence on honesty to a court 
at all costs; hence, Model Rule 3.3 requires a lawyer who has offered any sort of 
material false evidence to a court to take reasonable remedial measures to correct the 
court’s false impression, including disclosure of confidential information.270 
The ABA backed up its new-found urgency for honesty with Formal Opinions 
87-353 and 93-376.  Opinion 87-353 characterizes Rule 3.3 as a “major policy 
change with regard to the lawyer’s duty” in the face of perjury.271  It advises lawyers 
to disclose the perjury if it has happened before the “conclusion of the proceeding”272 
and if other remedial measures have been ineffective in rectifying the fraud.273  
Opinion 93-376 extends a lawyer’s disclosure duty to perjury that occurs pre-trial on 
the theory that even though perjured discovery may not become evidence at trial, its 
“potential” as evidence triggers the lawyer’s duty to take measures under the rule, 
“including disclosure if necessary.”274  With these opinions, the ABA was walking 
closer and closer to the line of insisting on complete truth in court to the detriment of 
client confidentiality, and yet, it never has just bravely crossed over that line and 
come down squarely on the side on which it so obviously wants to be. 
2.  Disclosure and Withdrawal Form a Deathlock 
When is disclosure “necessary” to rectify a client’s perjury?  Apparently, it is 
always necessary if the lawyer has not succeeded in slipping away from his client 
before the perjury occurs.  Of course, the rules make this anything but clear.  The 
comments to Model Rule 3.3 imply that if withdrawal will remedy the problem, a 
lawyer can avoid disclosing his client’s confidences in the service of correcting the 
record.275  But the ABA Ethics Committee concluded as early as 1987 that 
“withdrawal can rarely serve as a remedy for the client’s perjury.”276  Relying on 
Informal Opinion 1314, the Committee writing Opinion 87-353 drew this 
distinction: when the lawyer has notice that the client will perjure himself and can 
withdraw before submission of the perjury, the withdrawal is sufficient to fix the 
problem, and disclosure is not necessary.  On the other hand, if the lawyer is 
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surprised by the perjury, or if the client insists on perjuring himself when he gets on 
the witness stand, the lawyer must disclose the perjury or the intention.277 
Five years later, Formal Opinion 92-366 showed how far the Committee was 
willing to torture the language of the Model Rules to force both disclosure and 
withdrawal on a lawyer in the service of avoiding fraud—and not only fraud in court, 
which had hitherto been the Committee’s greatest concern.278  And then Opinion 98-
412 re-affirmed the withdrawal-before-perjury treatment as the only way to avoid the 
bitter medicine of disclosure: if the perjury happens during the representation, then 
the lawyer must disclose the perjury.  According to this opinion, disclosure is not 
necessary if the lawyer can accomplish his withdrawal before the client makes false 
statements to the court.  Once the lawyer has offered material false evidence, 
withdrawal “may” be insufficient to undo the harm caused by the perjury.279  All of 
this advice utterly conflicts with 1983’s Rule 3.3, which applies when the lawyer 
“has” already “offered” material false evidence.280  This “Quick—withdraw before 
he lies!” advice appears to be the Ethics Committee prescribing what it wishes were 
the rules, rather than interpreting the actual rules’ language—just as the dissenters 
from Opinion 92-366 charged in another context on withdrawal.281 
As it happened, the Rules did catch up with the opinions.  With the 2002 revision 
of Model Rule 3.3, the distinction between past fraud and future fraud became a 
mere memory: whether the lawyer knows that the client has already offered material 
false evidence or is planning on it, the lawyer is required to take reasonable remedial 
measures, including disclosure of the perjury, “if necessary.”282 
Emboldened by the ABA’s insistence on honesty at all costs, some states have 
gone even farther than the ABA in creating ethics environments in which lawyers are 
responsible for following rules that cannot be satisfied.  New Jersey provides one 
example.  Its expanded version of Rule 3.3 required disclosure by a lawyer of all 
material confidential information that might “tend to” mislead a court.283  The then-
Vice President of the New Jersey State Bar Association accused the rule of 
“essentially destroy[ing] whatever confidentiality exists between lawyer and 
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client.”284  He also opined that every trial lawyer in New Jersey grossly violated the 
rule “because no lawyer can represent a client and comply with that rule.”285  Even 
after the bar expressed deep concern and New Jersey amended its standard to require 
disclosure if an omission is “reasonably certain to mislead” a court,286 the state had 
disciplined twenty-three lawyers for falling short of compliance with the rule.287  The 
wonder here is that the number of discipline cases was not higher.  While the state 
changed its rule ostensibly to make interpretation and compliance less difficult, the 
change from “tend to” mislead to “reasonably certain to mislead” is semantic only 
and obviously—from the number of discipline cases—not one that lawyers could 
understand and fulfill. 
Despite the fact that Rule 3.3 characterizes disclosure as a last resort, because 
withdrawal is so rarely permitted to practicing lawyers, the rule, as applied, almost 
always requires disclosure of client confidences to remedy fraud on a court.  But 
instead of just writing a rule that says so, the drafters refuse to make that choice and 
instead force lawyers to agonize over whether to disclose perjury and subject their 
clients to all manner of bad results, or to maintain their confidentiality and suffer 
professional opprobrium.  If the ABA privileges truth to a court above every other 
consideration—and there can be no doubt now that it does—then it should simply 
say so in its rules and launch a new era in lawyer regulation. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Withdrawal from representation and disclosure of client confidences are 
inherently unworkable concepts if the ABA’s goal is the prevention of a court’s 
action on misleading information.  Comparably, the client’s narration of his story 
while the lawyer silently sits by is the ultimate white flag of the ABA drafters, their 
final, tacit admission that no lawyer can prevent perjury.  Unfortunately, none of the 
drafters seems cognizant of the fact—or willing to admit—that no lawyer can fix it 
without violating other principles of legal representation.  The reasonable remedial 
measures might be workable if the candor rule existed in a vacuum, without the 
conflicting rules of client confidentiality, zealous representation, and the Sixth 
Amendment.  When layered with these other principles, and when distinguished 
from what goes on in real courtrooms with real judges, these measures can claim no 
higher ground than a safe harbor,288 a checklist for a lawyer seeking protection from 
an ethics prosecution.  But even on that score, they fail.289  They are neither 
reasonable nor remedial. 
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If the ABA is serious about providing lawyers with a set of rules capable of 
satisfaction—as opposed to what it has now, which is a series of increasingly 
unreachable imperatives—it will start over with one goal in mind.  It will, after one 
hundred years, choose whether the more important goal is client confidentiality or 
candor to the court, and it will re-write the rules so that all mandates on lawyerly 
behavior point toward and can satisfy that one goal.  For example, Model Rule 3.3 
would work if courts and bar counsel would permit lawyers to disclose perjury 
without subsequent discipline for violating confidentiality.  In addition, or possibly 
instead, removing the various levels of knowledge that a lawyer must meet before 
being qualified to reveal confidences could fix the problem.  The ABA has refused to 
choose and has, instead, saddled lawyers with multiple conflicting goals and left it to 
them to sort out the mess.  The multiple competing goals have produced a failed 
regulatory state.  The ABA should exercise leadership by starting over, from the 
ground up, and draft a brand new version of rules.  The ABA should lead, rather than 
placing the burden of clairvoyance and interpretation on others.  Lawyers—not to 
mention judges and clients—simply deserve better. 
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